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A Conscious Event and Its Neural Correlate 
Robert L. Latta 
A conscious event， asfor instance a sensation， asfor instance a twinge of pain， ap-
pears in sense perception as a burst of neural impulses and hence is precisely that which 
so appears. Fundamentally， it is merely one of the indefinitely many things of indefinite・
ly many different types which appear. It differs in that it has a special epistemological 
status， on account of which it gives rise to the infamous problem of consciousness. 
When a conscious event occurs， it is not the case that two events， a very peculiar one， the 
conscious event， and an ordinary physical one， the burst of neural impulses， itsneural 
correlate， occur. Rather， just one event occurs， a natural event which appears in sense 
perception as a burst of neural impulses. But this is the key to the solution of the pro-
blem of consciousness. 
Keywords: philosophy， metaphysics， consciousness， mind， brain 
1.お1yposition: 
Let us begin with a point of comparison. A supernova is the explosion of a massive star. 
Suppose that a supernova occurs in another galaxy， millions of light years from Earth， and that a 
knowledgable observer， one who knows what it is that he is observing， an astronomer， observes it 
with the aid of a telescope. He observes it， then， millions of y回 rsafter it occurs. In this case， 
presumably， an event occurs， and in consequence， millions of years later， itappears to the 
observer as a supernova. 
Now consider a second case. Suppose that a burst of neural impulses (of a certain type， a 
burst that constitutes the neural correlate of a conscious event) occurs in the brain of a normal 
human being， and that a knowledgable observer， a neuroscientist， observes it with the aid of a 
sophisticated device. He observes it， then， a split second after it occurs. In this case， 
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presumably， an event occurs， and in consequence， a split second later， itappe紅 sto the observer 
as a burst of neural impluses. 
There is of course a parallel here: In each case an event occurs and，ぉaresu1t of perceptual 
processing， appears as such and such (a supernova in the former case， a burst of neural irnpulses 
in the later). The point， then， isthis: The event in the latter case， that which appears as a burst 
of neural impulses just as the event in the former case appears as a supernova， isa conscious 
event， asfor instance a sensation. 
To put it differently， just as an event of one type appe訂 sto a knowledgable human observer 
as a supernova， an event of another type， a conscIous event， app回 rsto a knowledgable human 
observer as a burst of neural irnpulses. 
An event occurs， and appe紅 sas a supernova. 1 take the following position: Another event， 
a conscious event， asfor instance a sensation， occurs， and appeむsas a burst of neural impulses. 
There is no ambiguity here. The term “occur" means just the same thing in these two cases， and 
the term “appear" means just the same thing. In each case， the perceptual process is simply a nor-
mal perceptual process. The parallel is perfect in every respect， although the two events are of 
course of widely different types， and differ utterly in epistemological status. This is quite simply 
true， and it is the key to the solution of the problem of consciousness. 
To summarize in a nutshell， then， a conscious event appears as its neural correlate-that is to 
say， ifit app回 rsveridically to a knowledgable human observer， one who knows that he is observ-
ing a burst of neural impulses. This is my basic thesis. If， then， X is the conscious event， then 
the neural correlate is X as X appears. 
The event which appears as a supernova is of course something which appears， whereas the 
supernova is something-viz.， the event just mentioned-as that something appears. Sirnilarly， 
the event which appears as a burst of neural irnpulses-viz.， the conscious event-is something 
which appears， whereas the burst of neural impulses is something-viz.， the event just mentioned， 
the conscious event-as that something appears. It is of course quite correct to say that the super-
nova appears， but equally correct to say that something appears as the supernova. Similarly， it is 
quite correct to say that the burst of neural irnpulses appears， but equally correct to say that 
something appears as the burst of neural impulses. The crucial thin 
146 
A Conscious Event and Its Neural Correlate (Robert L. Latta) 
2. Preliminaries: 
In this section， 1 state some of my prejudices， offer the reader a few words of guidance， make 
a few points of terminology， and outline the remaining sections. 
My prejudices are these: The philosophica1 problem of consciousness， incontrast with the 
neurophysiologica1 problem of consciousness， isa riddle， and one solves a riddle in one fel 
swoop， with a single insight， not gradua11y by piecing together the varied insights釘lddiscoveries 
of many researchers. There is no reason to suppose that this particular riddle is unsolvable. If it 
has gone unsolved to date， that is because no one has yet been lucky enough to hit on the key in-
sight. 1 believe， however， that my basic thesis， that a conscious event appears as its neura1 cor-
relate， isthe key insight. 
The reader might do well to try to understand this paper on its own terms on first reading， as
if he or she had never read the literature in the philosophy of mind， for 1 did not， infact， arrive at 
my position through reflection on the literature. 
1 ask the reader to assume that 1 mean exactly what 1 write， down to the last comma: not one 
whit more， not one whit les， and nothing even slightly different. 
1 prefer the expression “conscious event" to“conscious state，" because 1 think it accurate to 
say that the ongoing consciousness of a human being consists of events far more th阻 itconsists of 
states. Where possible， however， 1 prefer to refer to a sensation rather than a conscious event， 
for ease of comprehension. A sensation， of course， isa conscious event of a certain type. 
As 1 sha11 use the expression “appear， " tosay that something appears is to say that it appears 
as a result of perceptual processing. There is no such thing， then， asan appearance in the absence 
of perceptua1 processing. Perceptual processing， however， entails a physical or chemical stimulus 
which impinges on one or more organs of sense: the eyes， ears， or skin， and so forth. 
Throughout this paper， the case of the event which appears as a supernova is the paradigm of ap-
pearance. It is only verdical appearance， then， that comes into question. 
Section 3， the following section， describes the relation between my position on the one hand 
and the token-identity thesis on the other. My position entails but does not constitute a develop-
ment or version of this thesis. 
Section 4 takes up the question of the status of a conscious event. It attempts to explain that 
a conscious event has no specia1 ontologica1 status but does have a specia1 epistemologica1 status. 
Section 5 explains how itis that the specia1 epistemological status of a conscious event gives rise to 
the problem of consciousness. 
Section 6 explains how itis that the neural correlate of a conscious event and that conscious 
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event are numerica1ly identical while yet they have different properties. 
Section 7 offers three arguments for the thesis that a conscious event app開 rsas its neural cor-
relate. 1 think that the first of these arguments in conclusive， and that the three taken together are 
so afortiori. They do not， however， by any means constitute the whole case for this thesis. It is， 
1 think， obviously true， on reflection， that a conscious event appears as its neural correlate， and 1 
think that the obvious truth and explanatory power of this thesis will sooner or later carry the 
day. In this paper， then， my primary purpose is simply to plant this thesis in the awareness of the 
philosophical community. The reader ought not to see arguments here where there are none. 
Although Section 7 presents arguments， the paper as a whole features exposition， not arguments 
intended to bludgeon the reader into affrrmation. 
Section 8 scotches two objections to the effect that a conscious event cannot appear in sense 
perception. The first runs as follows: It is nonsense to assert that a conscious event， asfor in-
stance a sensation， emits or reflects a physical or chemical stimulus. It follows， however， that a 
conscious event cannot figure in a perceptual process. But if it cannot figure in a perceptual pro・
cess， then it cannot appear. The second objection is s加 pler.
Section 9 offers a definition of consciousness， and Section 10 attempts very briefly to answer 
the question of the extent and limits of“負rst-personauthority" with respect to one's own sensa-
tions. 1 take up this question to demonstrate the explanatory power of my basic thesis， simplyas 
a case in point. 
3. The relation between my position on the one hand and the token-identity thesis 
on the other: 
The token-identity thesis states that the neural correlate of a conscious event is that conscious 
event. My basic thesis， incontrast， states that the neural correlate of a conscious event is that con-
scious event ωit， that conscious event， appears. Thus my position entails the token-identity 
thesis. 
The token-identity thesis， then， iscorrect as f;紅 asit goes， for it states that the neural cor-
relate of a conscious event is that conscious event， and this is correct as far as it goes. It does not， 
however， go far enough， for it is necessary to add “as it appears" in order to make any sense of 
this assertion of identity. 
My position is not in any way， however， a development ofthe token-identity thesis. Rather， 
it entails and hence， ifsound， happens to verify it. 
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4. The status of a conscious event: 
A conscious event is mere1y a naturai event of a certain type， just as the event which appears 
as a supernova is a naturai event of a certain type. It has no speciai ontologicai status. 
On the other hand， conscious event-a twinge of pain， for inst組 ce-doeshave a speciai 
epistemologicai status， inthat one can know that it occurs and what it is like simply in that it oc-
curs. That is to say， one can know these things of it without using his eyes， ears， orother organs 
of sense. In contrast， one cannot know that the event which appears as a supernova occurs or 
what it is like simply in that it occurs， for one can know these things of it only by using his eyes. 
Thus you know your own twinge of pain as it occurs even if you don't know it as it appears in 
sense perception， whereas the astronomer knows the supernova only as it appears in sense percep-
tion. 
How isit， then， that a conscious event has this speciai epistemologicai status? The answer 
to this is so obvious that it might be easy to miss. First consider the event which appears as a 
supernova. Quite obviously， itis not at al of the type that goes to make up the ongoing con-
sciousness of a human being. In contrast， a conscious event which appears as a burst of neurai 
impulses in a human brain is of course precisely of the type that goes to make up the ongoing con-
sciousness of a human being. The latter event， the conscious event， has the speciai 
epistemologicai status it does simply because it is of this latter type. 
In a nutshell， then， the event which appears as a supernova does not go to make up the ongo-
ing consciousness of a human being whereas a twinge of pain， for instance， does，阻dthus the lat-
ter， the conscious event， differs from the former in that one can know that it occurs and what it is 
like simply in that it occurs， even though each of these events is simply a naturai event which ap-
pears as such and such-a supernova， a burst of neurai impulses-to a knowledgable human 
observer. 
Imagine this: A painter is painting a scene in oils. You can see his canvas and his paiette， 
but， for whatever reason， not the scene itself. You can know what the scene is like， then， only in-
sofar as he applies various pigments to his canvas in a pattern that serves to represent the scene. 
In contrast， you can know what his pigments themselves are like by looking at them on the 
paiette， whether or not he applies them to the canvas in a pattern that serves to represent the 
scene. The epistemologicai status of the pigments， then， isspeciai. A representation is requisite 
if you are to know what the scene is like， but no representation is requisite for you to know what 
the pigments themselves are like. The status of the pigments is speciai in this way， however， simp-
ly in that they， these particular pigments， constitute the medium of representation in this case. 
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But this illustrates a genera1 point: In any case， the medium of representation has a specia1 
epistemologica1 status. 
This， however， sufi.ces to explain the special epistemologica1 status of conscious events， and 
hence sufi.ces to explain the specia1 status of conscious events simpliciter: A process of perception， 
which involves a physica1 stimulus that impinges on the organs of sense， isrequisite if you are to 
know what a supernova is like， but no process of perception is requisite for you to know what a 
conscious event is like， simply in that conscious events are the medium， asit were， they very stuff， 
of consciousness， and hence of appearance. 
When a sensation occurs， the subject， ifhe possesses and applies sufi.cient powers of reflec-
tion， knows that it occurs and what it is like， insensory terms， even though it doesn't appear to 
him. He knows that the sky is blue-to take an example in which something， the sky， does ap-
pear-only in that a sensation of blue occurs under certain conditions， viz.， when he goes out-
doors and looks up， but he knows that that sensation of blue， orone qualitatively identical to it， 
occurs and what it is like simply泊thatit occurs. If he didn't know in sensory terms what the sen-
sation is like simply in that it occurs， thenー thisbears stressing-he wouldn't know in sensory 
terns what the sky is like in that the sensation occurs when he goes outdoors and looks up， which 
is to say that he wouldn't know in sensory terms， asof course he does know， what the sky is like， 
period. This is elementary. To assume that a person knows in sensory terms what something X 
is like only if and in that X appears to him is to commit an elementary error. It just isn't true. 
Sensations are the xception. 
5. How itis that the special epistemological status of a conscious event gives rise to 
the problem of consciousness: 
A conscious event gives rise， of course， toa problem， the problem of consciousness， whereas 
the event which appears as a supernova gives rise to no parallel problem. This is because， on ac-
count of the epistemological difference just indicated， one fa11s easily to the impression that in the 
former case we have two things， a very peculiar thing， the conscious event， and an ordinary 
physica1 thing， a burst of neura1 impulses， itsneural correlate， whereas in the latter case we have 
only one thing， an ordinary physica1 thing， the supernova. This impression is mistaken， but due 
to it， there app回 rsto be a special problem in the former case， a problem that has no para11el in the 
latter-viz.， the problem what so口ofthing the conscious event is and how it relates to the 
physical world， and in particular to its neura1 correlate. 
In fact the two cases are， torepeat， para11el in every respect， and thus there is no special pro-
blem in the former case， that of the conscious event. In the latter case， we have just one thing，叩
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event which appears as a supernova， and in the former case， likewise， we have just one thing， a 
conscious event， which appears as a burst of neural impulses. On the other hand， two events 
figure in the latter case: the event which app伺 rsas a supernova， and， for lack of a better expres-
sion， the event in which it appe紅 sas such， which is of course a conscious event. The first event 
occurs millions of y回rsbefore the second and thus is numerically diverse from it. But two events 
figure in the former伺 se，too: the event which appears as a burst of neural impulses， the conscious 
event， and the event in which it appears as such， which is also a conscious event. The first event 
occurs a split second before the second and thus is of course numerically diverse from it. 
In the former case， then， we do not in fact have one peculiar thing and one ordinary physical 
thing， but rather a natural event which appears as a burst of neural泊lpulses，just as， inthe latter 
case， we have a natural event which appears as a supernova. It is the special epistemological 
status of the conscious event， which is of course genuine， that gives rise to the illusion that we 
have peculiar thing in addition to an ordinary physical thing in the former case， and thus gives rise 
to the philosophical problem of consciousness. To expose this illusion， then， isto eliminate this 
problem. 
6. How itis that the neural correlate of a conscious event and that conscious event 
are numerically identical whi1e yet they have different properties: 
The token-identity thesis states， again， that the neural correlate of a conscious event is that 
conscious event. But this invites an objection: The neural correlate on the one hand and the con-
scious event on the other are very different indeed. They have different properties. How， then， 
can it be that they are one and the same thing? 
Now quite in general， ifX appears as Y-that is， veridically， inthe way in which the event 
which appears as a supernova appears as such-then Y is X as X appears， and hence Y=X. 
Hence my basic thesis， that a conscious event appears as its neural correlate， entails that the 
neural correlate is one and the same thing as the conscious event-I.e.， once again， it entails the 
token-identity thesis. It escapes the objection just stated， however， for if the neural correlate is 
the conscious event as the latter appears， then there is no reason to conclude that the two must be 
alike， no reason to conclude that they must have the same properties. 
But this cals for elaboration. Precisely how is it that the neural correlate and the conscious 
event are numerically identical while yet they have different properties? Take a sensation， for in-
stance. Let's say that the neuroscientist observes its neural correlate， which is of couse a burst of 
neural impulses. This burst appears， then， from his point of view. His subject， on the other 
hand， does not observe this burst， itdoes not appear to him in sense perception， but it does occur 
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from his standpoint. It occurs as a sensation， for that is what it is. Only one event， then， occ-
urs. It is a burst of neural impulses from the point of view of the neuroscientist and a sensation 
from the standpoint of the subject， but these are one and the same event. Hence it is that Y = X.
On the other hand， the event in which the subject's sensation appears as a burst of neural im-
pulses is， torepeat， a second event， numerically distinct from the sensation. This second event， 
however， it not merely numerically distinct from the sensation. It is qualitatively distinct， too: it 
has ditferent properties. Let the first event， the sensation， be an odor， for instance. Then it ap-
pears as a burst of neural impulses which centers on the olfactory area of the subject's brain. In 
contrast， the second event， that in which the first， the sensation， appears， itself appears， ifit does 
appear， asa burst of neural impulses which centers on the visual紅白 ofthe neuroscientist's 
brain. But since one can know what a sensation is like quite apart from the way itappears， itis 
possible to contrast the first and second events in another， more illuminating way: The first event， 
the sensation， isan odor， viz.， the odor the subject is in a position to report， while the second 
event， that in which the sensation appears as a burst of neural impulses， isa sight， viz.， the sight 
the neuroscientist is in a position to report. But this brings us to the crucial point: It is the nature 
of the second event which determines the nature of the first event， the sensation， asit appears， 
which is to say the nature of the neural correlate. The second event is the sight of a burst of 
neural impulses which centers on the olfactory area of the subject's brain. Thus the sensation as 
it appears， the neural correlate， isa burst of neural impulses which centers on the olfactory area of 
the subject's brain. The sensation， then， iswhat it is in that the first event is what it is， for the sen-
sation is the first event， but the sensation as it appears， the neural correlate， iswhat it is in that the 
second event， that in which the sensation appears， iswhat it is. But the first event and the second 
are very ditferent. Hence it is that X isvery ditferent from Y. 
The upshot， then， isthat Y = X but X is very ditferent from Y. 
What， then， of Leibniz's law-that if A=B， then of necessity A and B have precisely the 
same properties? It holds within the domain of things as they appear， and it holds within the do・
main of things wh 
7. Three arguments for the thesis that a conscious event appears as its neural cor-
relate: 
There follow three arguments for my basic thesis. The first is， 1 think， conclusive. It pro司
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ceeds from the fact that the neural correlate is something as that something appears， and asks 
“What is that something?" 
The neuroscientist literally sees the burst of neural impulses that is the neural correlate of the 
consCIous event， asfor instance the sensation， his subject experiences， though he must employ a 
sophisticated device to do so. But it follows that the neural correlate-unlike the sensation 
itselfー issomething as that something appears. What， then， it that something which appears as 
the burst of neural impulses the neuroscientist sees? There are two possibilities: it is the sensa-
tion， or it is something else. But the choice here iseasy indeed. The sensation correlates perfect-
ly with the burst of neural impulses. It correlates just as one would expect if the burst is the sensa-
tion as the sensation app回 rs. To begin with， the temporal relations are just as one would exp-
ect. Moreover， ifa qualitatively identical sensation occurs on another occasion， then a 
qualitatively identical burst occurs， and if a qualitatively identical burst occurs on another occa・
tion， then a qualitatively identical sensation occurs. Moreover， the sensation and the burst run 
parallel in various ways. Thus， perhapsー justto explain what this means-if and when the sensa-
tion becomes more intense in phenomenal terms， the burst becomes more intense in physical 
terms. 
In sum， then， there is no room for serious doubt: It is the sensation， not something else， 
which appears as the neural correlate. 
The second argument urges， intwo steps， that a sensation appe紅 sif a knowledgable observer 
looks for it in the right place at the right time， and asks “As what?" 
Clearly， a sensation-a twinge of pain， for instance-is not something as that something ap-
pears， for it is not through a process of perception that the subject knows that the sensation oc-
curs and what it is like; for contrast， a supemova is something as that something appears， for it is 
through a process of perception that an observer knows that the supemova occurs and what it is 
like. The sensation， however， is阻 eventthat occurs naturally， and thus it is to be assumed that it 
app伺 rs.Why shouldn't it appear? Is it hidden from human observation? But why should it be 
hidden? In what way is it hidden? To speak of a sensation is not， after al， tospeak of an event 
that occurs泊sidea black hole billions of light years from Ea 
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viz.， the sensation-as that something appears. What， then， isthis something which is something 
as that something appears? It is not the sensation itself， for the sensation itself is not， torepeat， 
something as that something app回 rs. There is on1y one possibi1ty as to he identity of this 
something， for there is only one thing which is something as that something appears and cor-
relates with the sensation in the ways one would expect，創ldthis is not， for instance， a burst of 
lightning on Jupiter， and dust storm on Mars， ora current in the Pacific Ocean， but rather a cer-• 
tain burst of neura1 impulses in the brain of the subject， the neura1 correlate， as it is called. 
Hence the neural correlate is the sensation as the sensation appeむs.
There is something， then， the neura1 correlate， which makes a perfect cartdidate for the role 
“that as which the sensation appears." But this makes it dificult to deny that the sensation ap・
pe紅 s.
To summarize this second argument， then， a sensation appears， but given that it does， there is 
no choice but to conc1ude that it appears as a certain burst of neura1 impulses， itsneura1 correlate. 
The third argument proceeds from an obvious fact， the fact that some relation or other ob-
tains between a sensation and its neural correlate， and asks “What is this relation?" 
There are three possibi1ties: it is the relation “appears as，" as exemplified by the case of the 
event which appears as a supernova; or it is simply the relation “is one and the same thing as， " the
re1ation of numerical identity; or it is some other relation. 
As for the thesis that the relation between a sensation and its neura1 correlate is the relation 
“appears as， " there is no plausible objection to it， for these two terms， once again， are correlated 
just as one would expect if in fact the former appeむsas the latter， and this in itself more or les 
clinches the case. As for the thesis that the relation is simply that of numerical identity， it is in-
deed attractive， for it explains some aspects of the correlation between the two terms. It fai1s， 
however， inthat it fai1s to explain how it can be that the sensation and the burst of neural im-
pulses are numerica11y identica1 while yet they are so very different， have such very different proper-
ties. And as for the thesis that the relation is some other one， this is scarce1y worthy of comment， 
for there is no plausible叩 s仰we釘rtωothe q明ueω側s幻t“io叩n
with" springs to rnind， for the sensation is indeed coordinated with its neural corre1ate. This fact， 
however， does not answer the question as to the relation: rather， itgives rise to it. 
To summarize this third argument， then， the relation which obtains between a sensation and 
its neural correlate is the relation “appears as，" not some other one. 
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8. Two objections to the effect that a conscious event cannot appear in sense percep-
tion: 
The first objection runs， torep回t，as follows: It is nonsense to assert that a conscious event， 
as for instance a sensation， emits or refiects a physical or chemical stirnulus. It follows， however， 
that a conscious event cannot figure泊aperceptual process. But if it cannot figure in a perceptual 
process， then it cannot appear. 
This objection fails. It is indeed nonsense， nevertheless， toasse口thata conscious event 
emits or refiects a physical or chemical stimulus. But just why is it nonsense? 
As such， a sensation is not something as that something appears in sense perception， but 
rather something which appears. Hence it does not pertain to the domain of things as they ap-
pe紅 insense perception. But the domain of things as they appe訂 insense perception， inthe way 
the event which appears as a supernova appears as such， iswhat we cal the physical world. As 
such， then， a sensation does not pertain to the physical world. There are， however， certain 
predicates which apply only to objects or events which pertain to the physical world. One of 
these is the predicate “…emits or refiects a physical or chemical stirnulus." This predicate， then， 
does not apply to a sensation. To put it differently， it makes no sense to say， for instむlce，that a 
phenomenal sound or odor emits or refiects electromagnetic radiation， for the predicate “…emits 
or refiects electromagnetic radiation" applies to something as that something appears， whereas a 
phenomenal sound or odor is not something as that something appears， but rather something 
which appe紅 s.
It is the supernova， then， not the event which appears as a supernova， which emits elec-
tromagnetic radiation that impinges on the retinae of the astronomer， and the neural correlate of 
the sensation (or a physical phenomenon associated with it)， not the sensation， which emits elec-
tromagnetic radiation that irnpinges on the retinae of the neuroscientist-or more accurately， that 
determines what pattern of electromagnetic radiation impinges on his retinae. 
To return to the objection， it fails because， although it is nonsense to assert that a conscious 
event emits or refiects a physical or chemical stimulus， itdoesn't follow that it cannot figure in a 
perceptual process. It can figure， for it can figure as a physical event， itsneural correlate. But to 
say that it figures as its neural correlate is to say that it figures， for it is (=) its neural correlate. 
If the subject has a sensation， he knows what it is like 
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it is too much to describe it as an event， ortoo much even to refer to it as“it" . Perhaps al one 
can say is this: The event which appears as a supernova is as it appears-assuming that the ap-
pe釘anceis veridical， i.e.， that the perceptual process includes no glitches. That is， perhaps one 
can describe that event only in terms， the term “event，" for instance， which describe it as it ap-
pears-that is， toa knowledgable human being. But this poses no problem. It means only that a 
human being can but describe that event as it appears to a human being. 
Now let us consider the process whereby the neuroscientist perceives a sensation as a burst of 
neural impulses. This very process， just like the supernova or the neural correlate of the sensa-
tion， issomething as that something appears. Thus， just as an event occurs and appears as a 
supernova， and one can describe it as an event， borrowing a term which applies to the supernova， 
its veridical appearance， soa process occurs and appears as the perceptual process in question， 
and one can describe it as a process， borrowing a term which applies to the perceptual process， its
veridical app回 rance.To describe this process， then， is to describe it as it appe紅 s.To describe it 
as it appears， however， isto describe it as a physical process. Hence the sensation figures in the 
perceptual process as a physical event， and specifically as a burst of neural impulses in the sub-
ject's brain. Likewise， the conscious event at the other end of the process， the sight of a burst of 
neural impulses in the subject's brain， also figures in the perceptual process as a burst of neural泊1・
pulses， a burst in the neuroscientist's brain. 
If， then， one demands to know how the sensation as such-not the neural correlate but the 
sensation-figures in the perceptual process， there is no answer， and thus there might appe紅 tobe 
a gap in the process. That is， the sensation might appear to be unconnected with the process， 
since it cannot be said to e凶tor reflect electromagnetic radiation or any other physical or 
chernical stimulus. The demand to know how the sensation as such負guresin the perceptual pro-
cess， however， isillegitimate， for， asjust explained， to describe the perceptual process is to 
describe it as it app回rs，and this is to describe it as a physical process in which the sensation 
figures as a burst of neural impulses， not as a sensation. 
The second objection runs as follows: Conscious events are the very medium of con-
sciousness， asopposed to the kind of thing that can appear. They cannot， then， appear. 
The rejoinder， however， is obvious: Conscious events are both the medium of consciousness 
and one kind of thing that can appear， and sensations， inparticular， are both the medium of ap-
pearances and one kind of thing that can appear. Indeed， it is precisely this fact that gives rise to 
the philosophical problem of consciousness in the first place. 
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9. A definition of consciousness: 
What， then， isthe consciousness of a human being? There are two ways to put the answer. 
The first way is this: The consciousness of a human being is a series of bursts of neural impulses. 
This is accurate， just as it is accurate to say， inthe analogous case， that the event in question is a 
supernova. The statement that consciousness is a series of bursts of neural泊lpulses，however， is
opaque， for it leaves the subject's standpoint out of account and gives no hint how to deal with 
the fact that consciousness on the one hand and the series of bursts of neural irnpulses on the 
other are so very ditferent. 
The second way to put the answer is this: The consciousness of a human being is a series of 
events which appears as a series of bursts of neural impulses. This too is accurate， just as it is ac・
curate to say， inthe analogous case， that the event in question is an event which appe紅 sas asuper司
nova. The statement that consciousness is a series of events which appears as a series of bursts of 
neural impulses is， 1 think， comparatively transparent， for it does take the subject's standpoint in・
to account， inthat it is from this standpoint that the first・mentionedseries of events-a series of 
sensations， perceptions， thoughts， conscious intentions， and so on-occurs， and does give a hint 
how to deal with the fact that consciousness on the one hand and the series of bursts of neural im-
pulses on the other are so ditferent: the former app回 rsas the later. 
The consciousness of a human being， then， isa series of events which appears to any 
knowledgable human observer， ifit appears veridically， asa series of bursts of neural irnpulses of 
a certain class or type in his or her brain. 
10. The extent and limits of “first-person authority" with respect to one's own sensa-
tlOns: 
The account 1 have outlined suggests answers to many questions in the philosophy of mind. 
1 shall give just one example here， inthe briefest terms. 
One knows what his own sensations are like not in that he perceives them-for of course he 
doesn't perceive them， doesn't know about them through his eyes，回rs，skin， or other organs of 
sense-but simply in that they occur from his standpoint. But since perception does not figure in 
the case， there is no chance of misperception. That is to say， there is no chance that a glitch wil 
occur in the process of perception， for there is no process of perception. To the extent that there 
is such a thing as“自rst-personauthority" with respect to one's own sensations， then， it lies precise-
ly in the fact that there is no chance of misperception. 
On the other hand，“負rst-personauthority" with respect to one's own sensations is indeed 
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l泊uted，and its limitations lie in the fact that even though there is no chance of misperception， 
there remains ample scope for miscognition， plenty of chance to commit errors in thinking about 
one's own sensations. 
11. Summary: 
A conscious event is not something as that something appears in sense perception. Hence it 
is not a physica1 event. It is， rather， something which appears in sense perception-when it does 
appe釘 -assomething. To be specific， itappe紅 sas a burst of neural impulses in the subject's 
brain. It has a special epistemological status because it goes to make up the ongoing con-
sciousness of the subject. Because it goes to make up his ongoing consciousness， he knows it as a 
conscious event. On the other hand， the neuroscientist knows it， the conscious event in question， 
in the way an astronomer knows a supernova-viz.， asit appe紅s.It occurs， then， from the stand-
point of the subject， asa conscious event， and app回rsfrom the point of view of the neuroscien-
tist as a burst of neura1 impulses. This circumstance， however， gives rise to the illusion that two 
things occur: a peculiar thing， the conscious event，創ldan ordinary physical thing， the burst of 
neural impulses. Thus arises the philosophical problem of consciousness. In fact， however， on-
ly one thing occurs: a natural event which appears as a burst of neura1 impulses. But though the 
burst of neural impulses and the conscious event are numerically identica1， they have different pro-
perties in that the burst is not the conscious event simpliciter， but rather the conscious event， the 
event which appears， asit appears as a result of perceptual processing. If the event in question 
were processed quite differently by an intelligent nonhuman being， then， presumably， it would ap-
pe紅， to him， quite differently， assomething quite other than a burst of neura1 impulses. 
The bottom line， then， isthis: A conscious event appears in sense perception as a burst of 
neura1泊lpulses，its neura1 correlate， and hence is precisely that which so appears. 
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